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Abstract
This paper analyzes the implications of the recently observed sharp expansion of foreign
banks to the Central and Easter European Countries (CEECs). Using a simple inter-
mediation model, we show that the mode of foreign entry has a pivotal impact on the
post-entry performance of banks in CEECs. Foreign greenfield banks are characterized
by a superior cost efficiency, compared to domestic and foreign acquired banks. The
efficiency of foreign acquired banks deteriorates in the initial year of acquisition, but im-
proves thereafter. Banks acquired by foreigners have less market power relative to the
rest of the banking system, while the impact of foreign greenfield entry on market power
is insignificant. Overall, CEECs banking sectors have benefited from the increased foreign
bank participation, both in terms of higher efficiency and more competition.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, one of the most remarkable developments in international banking
has been the sharp increase of foreign bank participation in Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs). The average market share of foreign-owned banks in 11 CEECs has grown
from 14% in 1995 to 80% in 2006 (see Figure 1), which is the largest increase of foreign bank par-
ticipation in emerging markets (IMF, 2000). At present, foreign banks account for a dominant
share of assets in most of CEECs (except for Slovenia), in some cases reaching the staggering
level of more than 90%. This pattern of foreign bank participation is in contrast to develop-
ments in industrial countries, where cross-border bank expansion is rare (Buch and DeLong,
2004).1 Naturally, it raises the question to what extent foreign bank entry benefits banks and
their customers in CEECs.
Theoretically, the increased foreign bank participation can affect domestic markets via in-
creased market competition and improved banking performance due to spillover effects (Lehner
and Schnitzer, 2008). The mode of foreign bank entry (greenfield investments versus cross-
border acquisitions) plays a crucial role in the transmission of benefits to domestic customers
(Claeys and Hainz, 2007). As opposed to cross-border acquisition, a greenfield entry increases
the total number of banks, inducing more competition. On the other hand, the primary motiva-
tion for the greenfield investment is usually to follow clients of the bank abroad (Aliber, 1984),
which might alleviate the effect of foreign entry on competition. Similarly, the performance of
foreign banks in emerging economies constitutes a trade-off. While foreign banks entering the
market have lower refinancing costs, host country banks have superior information about the
quality of domestic borrowers (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004).
Empirical literature provides mixed evidence on the impact of foreign bank entry on the
performance and competitiveness of banking systems in host countries. Claessens et al. (2001)
report that foreign bank entry leads to more competitive pressure and higher efficiency of
banks in the host country, implying positive welfare effects for economies liberalizing their
banking markets. However, this result holds only for the case of developing countries, while the
conclusions are reversed when considering foreign bank entry into developed economies. For the
case of CEECs, the impact of foreign bank participation on the performance measured by cost
efficiency is also mixed. Single-country studies on Croatia (Jemric´ and Vujcˇic´, 2002), Hungary
(Hasan and Marton, 2003) and Poland (Nikiel and Opiela, 2002) find that foreign-owned banks
1The main reason for relatively scarce worldwide evidence of cross-border bank expansion can be the limited
success of international takeovers. Major impediments that make banks reluctant to go abroad are related to
the geographical distance, language barriers, cultural aspects of home countries and differences in regulatory
and supervisory structures (Buch, 2000, Berger et al., 2001).
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are more efficient than domestic banks, while other studies on Hungary (Sabi, 1996), Croatia
(Kraft and Tirtiroglu, 1998) and Czech Republic (Matousˇek and Taci, 2002) find no evidence
supporting this view. Similarly, cross-country studies by Bonin et al. (2005), Fries and Taci
(2005) and Grigorian and Manole (2006) conclude that foreign participation tends to improve
the efficiency of domestic banks in CEECs, while Poghosyan and Borovicˇka (2007) find that the
positive effect of foreign ownership on cost efficiency may be biased due to the cream-skimming
effect (selection bias).
Most of this literature, however, does not distinguish between different modes of foreign
entry. The mode of entry can be crucial in interpreting the impact of foreign bank participation,
since different entry modes are driven by different motives. Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2008)
distinguish between acquired and greenfield banks and provide further evidence on the existence
of a selection bias. However, they conclude that the superior performance of CEECs banks
acquired by foreigners is earned rather than inherited.2 Claeys and Hainz (2007) distinguish
between greenfield entry and foreign acquisition in CEECs banking sectors and find that bank
lending rates have generally declined due to the foreign entry, but the impact is mainly driven
by the greenfield establishments.3 A similar conclusion is drawn for the case of Latin American
countries by Martinez Peria and Mody (2004). They find that interest margins of foreign
greenfield banks are lower than interest margins of domestic banks, as well as interest margins
of foreign banks that have entered through cross-border acquisitions.
The aim of this paper is to provide further insights on the relationship between different
modes of foreign entry and characteristics of banking systems in CEECs in terms of efficiency
and market power. Unlike previous studies, this paper explicitly acknowledges the possible
interplay between efficiency and competition when examining market power of domestic and
foreign banks. Our empirical specification is derived from a simple bank intermediation model,
which allows analyzing market power of banks after taking into account the cost efficiency
effects. The analysis is performed in two steps. First, the stochastic frontier model (SFA) is
applied to evaluate the cost efficiency of banks in CEECs. In the SFA formulation, time-varying
efficiency scores enable us to evaluate the possible spillover effects from the increased foreign
bank participation to the efficiency of banks in CEECs. In addition, the efficiency scores are
modeled as a function of the bank ownership structure in order to distinguish between the
2Still another evidence of selection bias characterizing foreign bank entry is provided by Lanine and Van-
der Vennet (2007). The authors find that foreign banks explicitly target large banks in CEECs in order to
extract benefits from increased market power. Poghosyan and De Haan (2008) show that the characteristics of
target banks in terms of their size and performance depend on the macroeconomic environment and institutional
background of host countries.
3It is important to note that the authors acknowledge that greenfield banks can exhibit additional market
power by specializing in particular segments of the market, but they do not provide empirical tests for this
hypothesis.
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relative performance of domestic, foreign greenfield, and foreign acquired banks. Second, we
evaluate the relative market power possessed by banks having different ownership structures
using an equilibrium relationship between bank lending rates, deposit rates, and marginal costs
(free of inefficiency effects) obtained from the intermediation model.
We find that greenfield banks are characterized by a higher degree of cost efficiency relative
to the domestic banks and foreign banks that entered through cross-border acquisitions. Per-
formance of the acquired banks deteriorates in the initial year of entry and improves the year
thereafter, resulting in an insignificant overall effect. The hypothesis that banking systems in
CEECs are characterized by a competitive market structure is rejected. However, the market
power of foreign acquired banks is substantially lower compared to the rest of the banks, con-
firming the positive impact of foreign bank entry on competition. Our results remain unchanged
when riskiness of bank portfolio, income from non-interest banking activities and developments
in the macroeconomic environment are taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a simple
bank intermediation model and outlines empirical strategy for testing the proposed hypotheses.
Section 3 describes data used in our analysis. Estimation results and their discussion are
provided in Section 4. The last section concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Theoretical background
The general framework for our investigation is the “new empirical industrial organization” ap-
proach of Bresnahan (1982), which has been adopted for the case of banking by Shaffer (1989,
1993) and extended to the “intermediation model” in more recent studies by Barajas et al.
(1999) and Vera et al. (2007).
Consider a representative bank i producing output in the form of loans or earning assets
(Li), and using deposits or financial liabilities (Di) and non-financial factors (labor and capital)
as inputs. Apart from loans, the bank is also required to hold reserves with the monetary
authority (Ri) on the asset side. The difference between total assets and deposits constitutes a
residual term called other net liabilities (ONLi).
4 The balance sheet condition for each bank
is: Li + Ri = Di + ONLi. Given the reserve requirement ratio (ρi =
Ri
Di
), the balance sheet
condition can be rewritten as:
Li −Di(1− ρi)−ONLi = 0. (1)
4This term can be further decomposed into bank equity and the rest of other net liabilities. We make use of
the fact that the minimal amount of equity hold by the bank given its earning assets is restricted exogenously
by the regulatory authorities and focus on competition in deposits and loans markets.
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In this simple formulation, there is no uncertainty and banks strive for profit maximization.
Each bank earns income from provision of loans (rLLi) and pays interest on acquired deposits
(rDDi). In addition, each bank incurs non-financial (real) costs from engaging into financial
intermediation (Ci), that depend on the output level (Li), prices for labor and capital (w), and
other non-financial inputs (x). Consequently, each bank’s profits (pii) can be expressed as the
difference between financial revenues and total (financial and non-financial) costs:
pii = rLLi − rDDi − Ci(Li, w, x), (2)
where rL and rD are the average lending and deposit rates. Banks maximize their profits by
choosing the optimal level of output. The first order condition for profit maximization is:5
∂pii
∂Li
= rL + Li
∂rL
∂Li
− rD ∂Di
∂Li
−Di∂rD
∂Li
− CLi = 0, (3)
where CLi =
∂Ci(Li,w,x)
∂Li
is the marginal non-financial cost of loan production. Making use of the
relationship between deposits and loans (∂Di
∂Li
= 1
1−ρi ) from the balance sheet identity (1) and
rearranging terms in the first order condition yields the following equation for the interest rate
spread:
rL − rD
1− ρi = −Li
∂rL
∂Li
+Di
∂rD
∂Di
1
1− ρi + CLi . (4)
This equation provides several useful insights. First, the interest rate spread is affected by
the reserve requirements imposed by monetary authorities, which represent financial taxation
costs incurred by a bank. Second, the size of the spread is affected by the production technology
used by a bank. More cost efficient banks use fewer resources to produce the required optimal
level of output, which results in a smaller difference between lending and deposit rates. Third,
the wedge between the lending and deposit rates is driven by the market power of a bank. In the
case of a non-perfect competition, an individual bank will be able to influence the industry-wide
interest rates, as indicated by the terms ∂rL
∂Li
and ∂rD
∂Di
.
Shaffer (1989, 1993) assumes that deposit markets are perfectly competitive (∂rD
∂Di
= 0)
and estimates equation (4) jointly with the demand function for industry-wide loans. In his
formulation, the interest rate elasticity of demand for loans in equation (4) is substituted from
the aggregate demand function and marginal cost is assumed to be a linear function of input
prices and output quantity. The system estimation approach yields a market power parameter
estimate for the loans market in the form of a conjectural variation coefficient, as is customary
in the “new empirical industrial organization” literature.
5Here we follow a quantity competition approach, in line with the ”new empirical industrial organization”
literature. However, it is important to note that a more realistic price competition approach would result in a
similar equilibrium condition linking marginal revenues and marginal costs of banks, which is used to test our
main hypotheses (see Freixas and Rochet, 2008, Chapter 3 for technical details).
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We pursue a slightly more restrictive approach suggested by Barajas et al. (1999), which
does not require a system estimation.6 Using the definitions of the interest rate elasticity of
demand for loans (ηL =
∂L
∂rL
rL
L
< 0) and the interest rate elasticity of demand for deposits
(ηD =
∂D
∂rD
rD
D
> 0), equation (4) can be rewritten as:
rL + rL
[
Li
L
dL
dLi
1
ηL
]
=
rD
1− ρi +
rD
1− ρi
[
Di
D
dD
dDi
1
ηD
]
+ CLi . (5)
Let’s further denote SLi =
Li
L
and SDi =
Di
D
as shares of bank i in the loan and deposit
markets, respectively. In addition, let’s denote RLi =
dL
dLi
(RDi =
dD
dDi
) as the responsiveness
of the total industry supply of loans (deposits) to the adjustment of loans (deposits) by bank
i. Using this notation, equation (5) can be rewritten as:
rL
[
1 +
SLiRLi
ηL
]
=
rD
1− ρi
[
1 +
SDiRDi
ηD
]
+ CLi . (6)
Equation (6) explicitly reflects the different effects influencing the market power of banks,
which are summarized by the expressions in brackets. An individual bank possesses higher
market power if the industry supply is less elastic; the size of bank operations is larger, and the
response of the industry output to the individual bank output decisions is greater. Rearranging
the equation and expressing the measure of market power in the loan market as MPLi =[
1+ SLiRLi
ηL
]
and the measure of market power in the deposits market as MPDi =
[
1+ SDiRDi
ηD
]
yields:7
rL =
rD
1− ρi
[
MPDi
MPLi
]
+
CLi
MPLi
. (7)
Given the sign restrictions on the interest rate elasticities of loan demand (ηL ≤ 0) and
deposit supply (ηD ≥ 0), the possible values for market power indicators can be derived as
MPLi ≤ 1 and MPDi ≥ 1, respectively.
In the case of a perfectly competitive industry, both indicators take the value of unity and,
hence, the coefficient
MPDi
MPLi
is equal to unity as well. In this case, the marginal revenue (interest
rate on loans) will be equal to the financial and non-financial marginal costs (deposit rate and
derivative of the cost function).
In the presence of market power in at least one of the markets (MPLi < 1 and/orMPDi > 1),
the coefficient
MPDi
MPLi
will be greater than unity. Barajas et al. (1999) and Vera et al. (2007) use
equation (7) as an alternative framework for testing the null hypothesis of no market power
6Econometric estimations of a system of equations using a full information maximum likelihood method is
problematic, since it produces inconsistent estimates for the whole system if one or more of the equations are
misspecified. Three-stage least squares method is an alternative estimator widely used in the literature, but it
assumes the availability of appropriate instruments.
7In the “new empirical industrial organization” literature, the terms MPLi and MPDi have been given an
interpretation of conjectural variations. However, we would refrain from this interpretation and would rather
view these terms as measures of gap between the price of bank output and the marginal cost.
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(
MPDi
MPLi
= 1), which is more simplistic relative to the system approach used in Shaffer (1989,
1993). For this purpose, these studies assume that the marginal cost (CLi) in equation (7)
is a linear function of bank output (Li) and input prices (w). This assumption, however, is
not innocuous. It disregards the cost efficiency of banks, which was found to be an important
determinant of net interest margins in several recent studies (see, for instance, Maudos and
Fernandez de Guevara, 2004). More efficient banks have the opportunity to operate with a
lower margin due to the gains from the less expensive conduct of intermediation activities.
Therefore, the analysis in this paper improves upon previous work by explicitly taking cost
efficiency of banks into account when evaluating their marginal costs. The next subsection
provides the details of our empirical approach.
2.2 Empirical methodology
The empirical assessment of the market power possessed by domestic and foreign banks in at
least one of the markets (loan or deposit) is based on the econometric estimation of the equation
(7), which can be represented in terms of a linear regression:
rLit = β0 + β1r˜
d
Dit
+ β2(r˜
d
Dit
∗DGF ) + β3(r˜dDit ∗DA) + β4CLit , (8)
where indices i and t denote bank and time, respectively, rLit is the implicit loan rate, r˜
d
Dit
=
rdDit
1−ρi
is the implicit deposit rate adjusted for the impact of financial taxation,8 DGF and DA are
dummy variables for foreign greenfield and acquired banks, and CLit is the marginal cost of
producing an extra unit of output for bank i in time t. Abstracting from interaction terms, a
value of coefficient β1 significantly larger than one would indicate the presence of market power
in at least one of the markets (loans or deposits) for the whole banking industry, including both
domestic and foreign banks. Introduction of the interaction terms allows to identify whether the
extent of market power differs between domestic and foreign banks. For instance, a significantly
negative (positive) coefficient β2 would suggest that market power of foreign greenfield banks is
lower (higher) than market power of domestic banks. The magnitude and sign of the coefficient
β3 can be interpreted in a similar way.
To carry out an econometric estimation of equation (8), one needs to introduce a measure of
marginal costs into the specification. Instead of pursuing the strategy of Barajas et al. (1999)
and Vera et al. (2007) and proxying the linear relationship between marginal costs and their
8The level of financial taxation ρi is an approximate measure, which serves only as a guideline for banks
in their intermediation activities. In reality, banks often hold excess reserves in their accounts at the central
bank for liquidity reasons. In addition, banks borrow money from the central bank in case their reserves are
not sufficient to fulfill the reserve requirements set up by the regulators. In the empirical estimations, we use
country-specific reserve requirements information from the international survey on banking regulation available
in Barth et al. (2008).
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underlying factors in an ad hoc fashion, the marginal costs are obtained directly from the data
using the stochastic efficiency frontier methodology.9 The advantage of this approach is that it
explicitly takes the impact of the cost efficiency of banks on the marginal cost of producing an
additional unit of output into account. By including the “inefficiency-free”measure of marginal
costs, we also control for the possible relationship between market power of banks and their
efficiency. In addition, using the information on the timing of cross-border bank acquisitions, we
are able to evaluate whether domestic banks taken over by foreigners improve their operational
efficiency after the acquisition.
Consistent with the intermediation model described above, let’s assume that banks produce
one unit of output (L) using labor, capital and borrowed funds as inputs. Let w1, w2 and w3
denote the prices of labor, capital and borrowed funds. To capture the technological progress
experienced by banks in CEECs during the last decade,10 a time trend (Trend) is introduced
among the determinants of the cost frontier. In line with previous cross-country studies, we
also control for possible shifts in the cost frontiers across countries due to differences in macroe-
conomic environment and institutional background by introducing country-specific (Cn) and
time-specific (Tm) dummy variables. The final translog specification of the cost function for the
stochastic frontier analysis takes the following form:11
ln
Cit
wit,1
= αi0 + α1 lnLit + α2 ln
(
wit,2
wit,1
)
+ α3 ln
(
wit,3
wit,1
)
+ α4Trend+
+ δ11
1
2
(
lnLit
)2
+ δ12 lnLit ln
(
wit,2
wit,1
)
+ δ13 lnLit ln
(
wit,3
wit,1
)
+ δ14 lnLitTrend+
+ γ11
1
2
(
ln
(
wit,2
wit,1
))2
+ γ12 ln
(
wit,2
wit,1
)
ln
(
wit,3
wit,1
)
+ γ13 ln
(
wit,2
wit,1
)
Trend+
+ θ11
1
2
(
ln
(
wit,3
wit,1
))2
+ θ12 ln
(
wit,3
wit,1
)
Trend+ ρ11
1
2
(Trend)2 +
+
11∑
n=1
φnCn +
16∑
m=1
φmTm + uit + vit, (9)
where αi0 captures individual bank random effects, vit ∼ N(0, σ2v) is the i.i.d. error term
and uit = Btui is the positive inefficiency term varying across banks and over time, which is
composed of two parts: a non-stochastic positive time component, Bt > 0, that is time-varying
but the same for all banks and a stochastic individual component, ui ∼ N+(µ, σ2u), which follows
9Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) contains an excellent textbook exposition of the stochastic efficiency frontier
methodology. Poghosyan and Borovicˇka (2007) is a recent application of this methodology for measuring the
cost efficiency of banks in a set of transition economies (including CEECs).
10See Fries and Taci (2005), Bonin et al. (2005) and Poghosyan and Borovicˇka (2007) for the recent empirical
evidence.
11This formulation takes into account the adding-up and symmetry restrictions imposed by theory. In ad-
dition, the linear homogeneity restriction is satisfied by deflating costs and the second input price by the first
input price.
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a truncated normal distribution with a conditional mean parameter µ. The inefficiency term
can be expressed in a general form as:
uit = exp(η
′Zit)ui, (10)
where Zit is a vector of factors affecting bank efficiency and η is a vector of coefficients. We use
several determinants of bank efficiency. First, the efficiency is modeled as a function of time
using the specification of Kumbhakar and Wang (2005): (t − t), where t is the beginning of
the sample. A significant positive (negative) coefficient in front of this variable would indicate
that over the whole sample period, efficiency of the banking sectors in CEECs has deteriorated
(improved). Since the sample period was marked by increased foreign bank participation,
the coefficient of this variable can be interpreted in terms of the overall impact of foreign
bank participation on bank efficiency in CEECs. Next, in order to discern the differences in
cost efficiency across domestic and foreign banks, we introduce dummy variables for foreign
greenfield (DGF ) and foreign acquired banks (DA) into the inefficiency specification (10). A
significant positive (negative) coefficient of these dummy variables would indicate that the
post-entry efficiency of the corresponding foreign-owned banks is on average lower (higher), in
comparison to the rest of the banking system. Finally, in a separate set of estimations, we
introduce current and lagged dummy variables for the year when the domestic bank was taken
over in order to evaluate the dynamic effect of cross-border bank acquisitions on the banks’
performance.
Using results from the stochastic frontier model, the estimate of the marginal cost term for
bank i at time t (CˆLit) is obtained through the partial derivative of the translog function:
CˆLit =
Cit
Lit
∂ lnCit
∂ lnLit
=
Cit
Lit
[
αˆ1 + δˆ11 lnLit + δˆ12 ln
(
wit,2
wit,1
)
+ δˆ13 ln
(
wit,3
wit,1
)
+ δˆ14Trend
]
. (11)
The marginal cost term CˆLit is adjusted for the influence of bank inefficiency and can enter
as an explanatory variable in equation (8). Using the generated regressor CˆLit on the right
hand side of (8) will influence the efficiency of the coefficient estimates due to the biased
standard errors (see Pagan, 1984). Therefore, the standard errors of the coefficient estimates
are bootstrapped using 2000 replications to ensure the robustness of our results.12
3 Data Description
The main source for the bank-specific information is the BankScope database of Bureau Van
Dijk, from which the information on individual banks operating in 11 CEECs (Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and
12The number of bootstrap replications is chosen based on the optimal criteria suggested by Andrews and
Buchinsky (2000).
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Slovenia) is retrieved for the 1992-2006 period. The dataset contains information on balance
sheets and income statements of 364 commercial, cooperative and savings banks.13 Unfortu-
nately, BankScope does not provide historical information on bank ownership, which is cru-
cial for our analysis. Therefore, we utilize the information on foreign-owned banks for the
years 1992-2004 from the extended dataset of De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) employed in
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2008).14 This dataset categorizes foreign-owned banks into two groups:
greenfield establishments and banks taken over as a result of a cross-border acquisition. For
the remaining two years, we update the missing foreign ownership information using a list of
cross-border bank acquisitions from Securities Data Company (SDC) mergers and acquisitions
database produced by Thompson Financial. From this source, data on completed (effective)
cross-border acquisitions are extracted (i.e. parents of bidder and target banks have different
countries of origin), which involve target banks from CEECs and that result in the control of
ownership by the bidder bank exceeding 50% of the equity.
Table 1 displays the evolution of foreign bank entry into CEECs. The dominant mode of for-
eign entry in the initial stage of transition has been the establishment of greenfield subsidiaries.
The number of greenfield banks has grown rapidly by mid 1990’s, remaining at comparable level
afterwards. Cross-border acquisitions became a popular mode of entry after the mid 1990’s,
growing at an accelerating pace with EU enlargement. In the last year of the sample, the share
of total banking system assets controlled by foreign banks amounted to 65.3%,15 out of which
15.1% (50.2%) is controlled by greenfield (acquired) banks, respectively.
Table 2 lists and describes the variables used and their sources. All variables are measured
in US dollars and deflated by the consumer price index, using 1995 as a reference year.16 Before
proceeding with the empirical analysis, observations with missing information in at least one of
the variables listed in Table 2 are dropped. Furthermore, to confront the influence of extreme
observations and reporting errors, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Descriptive statistics of the resulting dataset are reported in Table 3. The Table shows that
foreign greenfield banks have lower scale of operations and incur lower costs in comparison to the
foreign acquired and domestic banks. This is due to the fact that the main mission of greenfield
banks is to serve their clients abroad, rather than to engage into full scale operational activities
in CEECs. There is also high variation in terms of loan rates: domestic and foreign greenfield
13We use unconsolidated statements of banks, replacing them by consolidated statements whenever informa-
tion on unconsolidated statements is not available.
14We thank Emilia Jyrzyk and Iman Van Lelyveld for kindly sharing their data on bank ownership.
15Difference between the share of total assets controlled by foreign-owned banks in the sample and the EBRD
information reported in Figure 1 is due to the fact that BankScope does not cover all banks in the economy. In
addition, our estimates refer to commercial, cooperative and savings banks only, while the EBRD data covers
all banks in the country.
16Consumer price index data are extracted from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
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banks charge on average more for their loans that foreign acquired banks. However, the variation
of deposit rates across banks is relatively modest. This observation can be explained by the
fact that depositors find it easier to switch banks when discrepancy in deposit rates is high,
while lending rates are to a large extent influenced by relationships of banks with their clients
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Domestic and foreign banks also differ in terms of the riskiness
of their loan portfolios: domestic and foreign acquired banks have higher loan-loss provision
reserves relative to the foreign greenfield banks.
To sum up, the preliminary analysis of the descriptive statistics highlights apparent differ-
ences between domestic, foreign greenfield, and foreign acquired banks in terms of the scale of
their operations, incurred costs, and riskiness. These differences may be related to different
missions and strategies employed by these banks, reflected in their portfolio mix. However, the
simple comparison made using summary statistics lacks theoretical argumentation and does not
allow drawing firm conclusions regarding foreign bank entry effects on efficiency and market
power. In the remainder of the paper, these issues are addressed using a more formal framework.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Foreign bank entry and cost efficiency
The empirical approach for evaluating the impact of foreign entry on bank efficiency is based
on the stochastic efficiency frontier methodology (SFA). We follow the intermediation approach
widely used in the banking literature (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) and assume that banks are
minimizing their costs given the optimal amount of earning assets to be generated, prices for
inputs (labor, capital and financial resources) and technological constraints. Bank costs (C) are
measured as the total operating expenses incurred by banks. Bank output (L) is proxied by the
total earning assets in the bank’s portfolio.17 Following the literature on bank efficiency, labor
prices are measured as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (w1), capital prices as the
ratio of administrative expenses (other than personnel expenses) to total assets (w2) and prices
of borrowed funds as the ratio of interest expenses to a sum of total deposits and other funding
(w3). We control for the possible influence of environmental differences across countries (e.g.,
macroeconomic developments, institutional background) and over time (e.g., shocks common
to all CEECs), by using country and time dummies.
The outcomes of the SFA model estimations are summarized in Table 4. The main focus of
this analysis is the determinants of cost inefficiency, shown in the middle panel of the Table.
Let’s start by introducing time trend as inefficiency determinant in the specification (I). The
17In a separate set of estimations, we subdivided bank output into two categories: total loans and total
security holdings. The estimation results yielded qualitatively similar outcomes and are available upon request.
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negative significant coefficient of the trend variable suggests that efficiency of banks in CEECs
has on average improved over time, which is in line with the evidence provided by Rossi et al.
(2004). Increased foreign bank participation has possibly influenced this general efficiency
improvement directly (through the higher efficiency of foreign banks) or indirectly (through the
increased competition due to foreign entry and knowledge spillovers).18
In order to evaluate the direct impact of foreign bank participation, in specifications (II) and
(III) dummy variables for foreign greenfield and foreign acquired banks are introduced. The
estimation results suggest that foreign greenfield banks have higher efficiency than the rest of
the banking sector, while the impact is insignificant for the foreign acquired banks. Introducing
both dummy variables simultaneously as inefficiency determinants in the specification (IV)
does not alter these results. This finding has important policy implications: it highlights the
importance of the entry mode on the performance of foreign banks. It also suggests that the
primary motivation behind foreign entry affects the post-entry performance of banks. While
foreign greenfield banks are mainly established with the purpose to serve the clients of their
parent banks, the entry via cross-border acquisitions is primarily motivated by the efficiency
improvements and market power considerations (Lanine and Vander Vennet, 2007). As argued
by Detragiache et al. (2008), bank costs after the takeover can increase due to additional
expenses related to the need to increase the quality of monitoring activities.19 In order to
capture this dynamic effect, in specifications (V) - (VII) current and lagged dummy variables
for the year when the bank was taken over are introduced.20 We find two offsetting effects on
the efficiency following the foreign acquisition: the immediate impact is significantly positive
(deterioration of bank efficiency), while the one period lagged impact is significantly negative
(improvement of bank efficiency). These two offsetting effects together with the fact that
efficiency gains disappear in the second period, as shown in the specification (VII), might
explain the insignificant overall impact of the acquisition dummy variable in the specifications
(III) and (IV).
These findings are also in line with various case studies on foreign bank acquisitions in
18In a separate set of regressions, we replaced the time trend by the yearly series on the market share of
foreign bank assets from EBRD (2007). In these estimations (available upon request), a significant negative
coefficient in front of the foreign market share variable was obtained, suggesting that the efficiency improvement
is correlated with the increased foreign bank participation.
19Another explanation for the insignificant relationship between the bank acquisition and its subsequent
efficiency improvement might be the additional costs incurred in the process of reorganization and restructuring,
which most of the banks undergo following the takeover. Still another possibility might be that target banks
introduce new services, which requires installation of new equipment and facilities causing an upsurge of costs
in the short-run.
20This dummy variable captures 64 cross-border bank acquisition events. The number of feasible observations
for cross-border acquisitions decreases to 53 (44) when the impact of the takeover is evaluated with a one period
(two periods) time lag.
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CEECs. For instance, Abarbanell and Bonin (1997) discuss the impact of privatization of
the Polish Bank Slaski (BSK) to a foreign investor in the 1990s. The authors find that the
privatization of the bank by foreign investors did not lead to an immediate improvement of
its managerial performance. One explanation is that the top management who ran the bank
prior to the privatization did not change following the privatization, due to the “...strength of
personality, political influence, and superior knowledge of banking...” (Abarbanell and Bonin,
1997, p. 46). Similar evidence has been documented in a case study on privatization of the
Russian Zhilsotsbank (Abarbanell and Meyendorff, 1997). However, the authors caution that
the results of privatization should not be judged only on the basis of the short-run financial
performance and that a “...critical lesson to be learned from the privatization of BSK is the
importance of a foreign financial investor taking an active role in the development of bank
strategy to bring about the fundamental changes necessary to realize the potential franchise
value.” (Abarbanell and Bonin, 1997, p. 57).
To sum up, we find that the mode of foreign entry has different implications for bank
efficiency. Foreign greenfield banks outperform domestic banks in terms of cost efficiency, while
the efficiency of foreign acquired banks is not significantly different from that of domestic
banks. The later result can be explained by offsetting effects on efficiency following the foreign
acquisition.
4.2 Foreign bank entry and market power
In order to evaluate the market power of banks, the following variables are used in specification
(8): the implicit lending rate (rLit) is defined as the ratio of total interest income to total loans,
and the implicit deposit rate (rDit) is proxied by the ratio of total interest expenses to total
deposits. The deposit rates are adjusted by the corresponding reserve requirement ratios in
each of the CEECs (see Table 2). To evaluate the impact of foreign ownership on market power
of banks, interaction terms of the average deposit rate with a foreign greenfield bank dummy
(rDit ∗ DGF ) and with a foreign greenfield bank dummy (rDit ∗ DA) are introduced. Together
with the marginal cost estimates (MˆC) obtained from the SFA specification (IV) in Table 4,
these variables can be used for conducting the market power test using equation (8).
Table 5 shows the estimation results of (the augmented) equation (8). We account for het-
erogeneity across banks located in different CEECs with varying levels of economic development
and regulatory structures by applying a panel data estimation technique. All estimations are
done by fixed-effects OLS, which was found to outperform the random-effects method based
on the Hausman test. Standard errors are estimated using residuals clustered by countries, to
relax the assumption of cross-sectional independence. Panel test for serial correlation based on
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the procedure of Drukker (2003) suggests that residuals in all specifications are free from first
order autocorrelation effects.
Specification (I) describes the baseline model. The coefficient of the deposit rate variable is
significant and greater than one. The Wald test rejects the hypothesis that the market power
coefficient is equal to one, suggesting that the CEECs banking system as a whole exhibits
market power. This finding applies to all banks in CEECs, regardless of their ownership. To
evaluate the impact of bank ownership on market power, the corresponding interaction terms
are included in specifications (II) and (III). The coefficients of interaction terms suggest that
foreign acquired banks have a significantly lower market power compared to the rest of the
banking system, while the market power of greenfield foreign banks is not significantly different
from the rest of the banking system. This finding does not alter when both interaction terms are
added to the model simultaneously in the specification (IV). The Wald test suggests that market
power coefficient of foreign acquired banks is not significantly different from one, supporting
the competitive markets hypothesis for these banks. This result contrasts the prediction of
the Claeys and Hainz (2007) model, in which competition in the domestic banking markets is
stronger for the greenfield entry, compared to the acquisition entry.21 Our estimations suggest
that cross-border bank acquisitions result in a more competitive banking environment, which
has important policy implications.
4.2.1 Robustness check
There are several important aspects of banking that are not captured in the theoretical model of
market power. The first is the presence of uncertainty and credit risk. To control for the impact
of risk, we follow Barajas et al. (1999) and Vera et al. (2007) and introduce the share of loan-loss
provisions in total loans as a proxy of quality of bank loan portfolio.22 The second aspect is the
presence of non-interest banking services, which might be considered as additional revenue for
banks and might influence their degree of riskiness and market power (Lepetit et al., 2008). To
control for the impact of fee-generating activities of banks, we follow Maudos and Fernandez de
Guevara (2004) and augment our specification by introducing the ratio of non-interest revenues
to total assets as a proxy for implicit interest revenues of banks. Finally, macroeconomic
fundamentals might influence the depth of financial intermediation in the country (Cotarelli
et al., 2005) and decision of banks to go abroad. We control for the macroeconomic environment
by introducing real GDP growth, inflation and exchange rate changes in our specification.
21Claeys and Hainz (2007) do not consider the “follow clients abroad” motive for foreign bank entry in their
model, which might explain this contradictory result.
22A more direct measure of loan portfolio quality would be the share of non-performing loans in total loans.
However, BankScope is missing information on non-performing loans for more than half of banks in the sample,
for which reason we rely on loan-loss provisions as an indicator of loan portfolio quality.
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The introduction of additional variables to control for banking risks (LLP ), service incomes
(IMPL) and macroeconomic environment (GDP , INFL and FX) in specifications (V), (VI),
and (VII) does not change the main results. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction
term with foreign greenfield dummy remains insignificant, implying that even after accounting
for credit risks, non-interest banking activities and macroeconomic variables, greenfield banks
do not exhibit greater market power than the rest of the banks. This can be due to the special
position that greenfield banks occupy for their customers in CEECs, since most of them do not
have alternative sources of bank financing due to already established relationships with their
long-term partner banks.
In line with the theoretical prediction, banks with riskier loan portfolios and higher share
of non-interest banking activities charge higher lending rates.23 The later result supports the
findings of Lepetit et al. (2008), according to which banks expanding to non-interest income ac-
tivities are riskier than banks focused on lending, which is reflected in higher loan rates. Among
macroeconomic variables, we find positive and significant effect of exchange rate depreciation
on loan rates, which suggests that currency stability has important implications for lending
decisions of banks.
To sum up, the estimation results reject the competitive market structure hypothesis in
CEECs, as the estimated market power coefficients are significantly larger than one for the
whole banking sector. This indicates that banks in CEECs possess market power at least
in one of the markets (loans or deposits).24 The market power of foreign acquired banks is
significantly lower than that of the rest of the banks. Foreign greenfield banks don’t exhibit
lower market power, suggesting that increase in competition as a result of the foreign entry is
mainly driven by cross-border acquisitions.
5 Conclusion
The recent sharp increase in foreign bank participation in CEECs raises a series of questions
regarding the implications of this pattern for banks and customers in host countries. This study
highlights the existence of a complex relationship between different modes of foreign bank entry
and the post-entry banking performance.
23Since interest income of banks can be affected by the quality of loan portfolio, using LLP among explanatory
variables may introduce endogeneity bias in coefficient estimates. To control for possible endogeneity, in a sepa-
rate set of regressions we use lagged LLP among explanatory variables. The estimation results are qualitatively
similar to the specification with contemporaneous LLP and are available upon request.
24Since the deposit market is likely to be more competitive than the loan market due to the negligible bank
switching costs for depositors and prevalence of relationship-based lending, we suggest that the main part of
the market power comes from the loan markets. Relatively lower variation of deposit rates relative to the loan
rates in our sample lends support for this argumentation (see also discussion in Section 3).
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Foreign greenfield banks exhibit superior operational efficiency in comparison to domestic
and foreign acquired banks. This can be explained by the specialization of greenfield banks
to serve customers of their parent banks abroad and already established banking relationships.
The performance of foreign acquired banks exhibits an offsetting dynamic pattern: the efficiency
deteriorates in the initial year of acquisition, slightly improving in the subsequent year. The
overall impact on the post-acquisition performance evaluated for the whole sample is insignifi-
cant, which can be due to the poor managerial and financial characteristics of target banks in
CEECs inherited by foreign investors.
We also find evidence on differences in market power across domestic and foreign banks.
Market power of foreign greenfield banks is not significantly lower than that of domestic banks.
This result holds when the impact of credit risks, non-interest banking activities and macroe-
conomic environment are taken into account, contrasting the evidence from studies, which do
not control for the cost efficiency of banks when analyzing market power. Unlike greenfield en-
trants, foreign acquired banks exhibit a substantially lower degree of market power, which can
be explained by the increased competition due to foreign entry and the strategic considerations
of foreign banks entering a new market.
The analysis conducted in this study provides important policy implications. It documents
a significant improvement of banking performance in CEECs measured by cost efficiency during
the sample period corresponding to an increase in foreign bank participation. CEECs banks
and customers clearly benefited from foreign participation directly (superior post-entry perfor-
mance of greenfield banks) and indirectly (overall increase in bank efficiency due to spillover
effects to domestic banks). Opening the borders for foreign entry has also contributed to the
competitiveness of the banking industry in CEECs, but largely due to cross-border acquisi-
tions. In this sense, this study finds support for the conventional believe by the policymakers
that liberalization of domestic banking industry and promotion of foreign entry would have a
positive impact.
However, these conclusions should be interpreted with caution, since this study does not
address the issue of financial stability in CEECs. During the recent financial crisis, banking
sectors in CEECs have proven to be very vulnerable to systemic external shocks. The impact
of the increased foreign bank participation on financial stability is an important topic, which
requires the attention of policymakers and needs to be addressed in the future research.
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Figure 1: Share of foreign-owned banks in total banking system assets (%), 1995-2006
Source: EBRD (2007).
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Table 2: Variable definition and sources
Variable Definition Measure Source
C Bank costs Total operating expenses BankScope
L Earning assets Total earning assets BankScope
w1 Price of labor Ratio of personnel expenses to total as-
sets
BankScope
w2 Price of capital Ratio of administrative expenses
(other than personnel expenses) to
total assets
BankScope
w3 Price of borrowed funds Ratio of interest expenses to a sum of
total deposits and other funding
BankScope
DGF Foreign greenfield Dummy variable that takes value of 1
for greenfield establishments of foreign
banks
De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006),
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2008)
DA Foreign acquired Dummy variable that takes value of 1
for domestic banks acquired by a for-
eign bank
De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006),
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2008) and
Thomson’s SDC Platinum Database
DFE Foreign entry Dummy variable that takes value of 1
in the year when a domestic bank was
taken over by a foreign bank
De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006),
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2008) and
Thomson’s SDC Platinum Database
rL Implicit loan rate Ratio of interest expenses to total
loans
BankScope
rD Implicit deposit rate Ratio of interest expenses to total de-
posits
BankScope
MC Marginal costs Derivative of the cost function ob-
tained from the stochastic frontier
model with respect to output quantity
BankScope and own estimations
LLP Loan-loss provisions Ratio of loan-loss provisions to total
loans
BankScope
IMPL Implicit interest revenue Ratio of the net non-interest revenues
to total assets
BankScope
ρ Reserve requirements ratio (%) Bulgaria=8, the Czech Republic = 2,
Estonia = 16, Croatia = 19, Hungary
= 5, Latvia = 8, Lithuania = 6, Poland
= 3.5, Romania = 20, Slovakia = 2,
Slovenia = 2.
Barth et al. (2008)
GDP Economic activity Annual real GDP growth World Development Indicators
(WorldBank)
INFL Inflation Annual growth in consumer price index
(CPI)
World Development Indicators
(WorldBank)
FX Currency stability Annual growth of average exchange
rate vis-a-vis US dollar
International Financial Statistics
(IMF)
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